Monday, January 12, 2026

TIL: Anyone Can Vote in the Hugo Awards — Come Join Me in LA!

Every once in a while, you stumble across a piece of writing that completely changes how you see a community you’ve been part of for years. That happened to me this week when I read Molly Templeton’s fantastic Reactor column about the Hugo Awards and the World Science Fiction Convention (Worldcon).

Like a lot of lifelong SFF readers, I always assumed the Hugos were something distant—decided by insiders, professionals, or some mysterious academy. Molly’s piece made it crystal clear: anyone can nominate and vote in the Hugo Awards. All you have to do is become a supporting member of this year’s Worldcon. That’s it. No secret handshake. No gatekeeping. Just a $50 supporting membership and a love of science fiction and fantasy.

And honestly? I’m thrilled.

I immediately signed up for LACon V, this year’s Worldcon in Los Angeles, and that means I’m officially a Hugo Awards voter and nominator for 2026. I can’t wait to dive into the nomination process, explore new works, and participate in shaping the conversation around the genre I love.

If you’ve ever wanted a more direct way to support the books, stories, creators, and ideas that matter to you, this is it. The deadline to register as a supporting member is January 31, and Molly’s article walks through the whole process clearly and encouragingly.

Read Molly Templeton’s article here: https://reactormag.com/anyone-can-vote-in-the-hugo-awards-and-heres-how/

Register for LACon V (in person or supporting): https://www.lacon.org/register/

If you decide to join, let me know—I’d love to have more friends and fellow readers along for the ride (and not just literally - I'll be driving there from the SF Bay Area if you want to carpool). Whether you’re nominating novels, short fiction, podcasts, art, or dramatic presentations, your voice genuinely matters. A single nomination can make a difference.

See you (hopefully!) in LA—and in the Hugo voter packet.

Sunday, January 11, 2026

REVIEW: "Old Man's War" series by John Scalzi - Part 1 (Books 1-5)

Memory, Identity and the Bodies We're Allowed to Have

I’ve been deep in John Scalzi’s Old Man’s War series, and after reading Charlie Jane Anders’ piece on the rise of “memory‑sharing” fiction, I’ve been thinking a lot about how these books handle identity, embodiment, and what actually makes a person who they are. Scalzi was playing with memory transfer almost twenty years ago, but reading it now — in a moment when SFF is finally digging into the messy implications of memory and consciousness — makes the limits of his worldbuilding stand out.

The basic setup is that you sign up with the Colonial Defense Forces, and on your 75 birthday head to the recruiting station to go to space to serve for 10 years. You give up your family, property and all connection to Earth: you can never return. There's a vague promise of physical improvement - but nobody expects that their mind, memories and consciousness will be transferred into a new body. It’s engineered, green, enhanced, and built from your DNA. You get SmartBlood™, a BrainPal™, and a body that can do things your original one never could. But it’s still recognizably “you.” Same gender. Same general shape. Same hair color. No one asks whether they can choose something different — a different gender, a different form, something adapted for a specific environment, or even something non‑human. In a universe with hundreds of alien species, the idea that the only acceptable upgrade is “you, but greener and stronger” feels like a huge missed opportunity.

What’s even stranger is how little the recruits ask about any of this. They don’t ask what else they’re giving up. They don’t ask what happens to their consciousness if they die. They don’t ask whether backups exist. They don’t question about the combat death rate, which is shockingly high. More than three‑quarters of them won’t survive the ten‑year service requirement. And no one asks what happens to their DNA if they die before they ever leave Earth.

Some of these questions are answered in the second book, The Ghost Brigades, where we learn that the Colonial Union uses the DNA of recruits who die early to create entirely new soldiers. These aren’t clones or resurrected versions. They’re new people — engineered bodies with no memories, no Earth ties, and personalities shaped by training and tech. It’s a massive ethical leap, and the story treats it as routine.

There’s also the moment when John Perry meets a woman grown from his dead wife’s DNA. She isn’t his wife. She isn’t a copy. But she has echoes of the woman he loved, and they eventually build a relationship. It’s emotionally complicated, and the book acknowledges that, but it never really sits with the implications of creating a person who looks like someone you lost.

Scalzi does occasionally push into deeper territory. There’s the soldier seeded with the memories of a traitorous scientist, who starts experiencing impulses that aren’t his own. There are the debates in The Human Division about whether the upgraded soldiers are the same people they were before or just copies running on new hardware. These moments are fascinating, and then the story moves on. The series keeps brushing up against the big questions without fully committing to them. Initially, the series started off as satire of the genre - but as I get through more installments, it seems like the author is more fully committing to this universe, tropes be damned.

Charlie Jane Anders wrote about a trend in SFF around memory sharing (see https://reactormag.com/the-most-surprising-book-trend-right-now-memory-sharing/ ). This piece helped me see the contrast more clearly. Scalzi planted the seeds of the memory‑sharing trend, but the genre has since moved into much more ambitious territory. Today’s SFF treats memory as a technology, a vulnerability, a political tool, a form of intimacy, a destabilizing force. Scalzi hints at all of this, but he keeps the frame narrow. The result is a universe full of potential that the narrative doesn’t quite explore.

And honestly, that tension — the ideas he sets up versus the ones he doesn’t follow — is part of what makes reading the series now so interesting. I have several more books to go in the series and will report back on any developments I catch in books 6 and 7.

Thursday, January 08, 2026

CA DMV Password Reset Bug: Technical Appendix for Engineers

 

(Designed for engineering, security, QA, and infrastructure teams)

Technical Summary of Observed Behavior

Affected Domains

The following valid domains are rejected or fail silently:

  • Personal domains (multiple)

  • boldium.com

  • adobe.com

  • abbott.com

  • northeastern.edu

Accepted Domains

  • gmail.com

  • yahoo.com

  • hotmail.com

  • outlook.com

  • Completely fake Outlook addresses (e.g., random strings)

Delivery Behavior

  • Consumer domains receive verification emails instantly.

  • Non‑consumer domains receive no email or receive emails hours later.

  • Delayed emails contain links tied to the original browser session, which has expired.

Client‑Side Environment

Issue reproduced on:

  • Latest Chrome on macOS (Mac mini + two MacBooks)

  • Latest iOS on iPhone

  • Latest myDL app

  • Multiple networks

  • Clean browser sessions

  • No caching or cookie issues

  • No outdated software

This confirms the issue is not client‑side.

Likely Root Causes (Ranked)

1. Hardcoded Domain Allowlist (Most Likely)

Evidence:

  • Fake Outlook addresses accepted

  • Valid corporate/university/personal domains rejected

  • Instant delivery to Gmail/Yahoo/Hotmail/Outlook

  • “Domain not recognized” errors for legitimate domains

This strongly suggests a restrictive allowlist of consumer email providers.

2. Misconfigured Email Security Gateway

Possible systems:

  • Cloudflare Email Security

  • Proofpoint

  • Mimecast

  • Microsoft Defender

  • Cisco IronPort

Potential misconfigurations:

  • Domain reputation API rejecting non‑consumer domains

  • Allowlist/denylist rules applied incorrectly

  • Anti‑fraud scoring over‑blocking legitimate domains

  • Routing rules sending non‑consumer domains through a slow or failing path

3. Application‑Layer Domain Validation Logic

Possible issues:

  • Regex or validation rules that only accept common consumer domains

  • Incorrect domain parsing

  • New fraud‑prevention module introduced between August and December

  • Silent failure paths for unrecognized domains

4. Routing or MTA Configuration Changes

Potential causes:

  • Split routing based on domain category

  • Misconfigured secondary route for “unknown” domains

  • Delayed retries causing multi‑hour delivery

5. DNS or Authentication Checks

Unlikely but possible:

  • SPF/DKIM/DMARC lookups failing or timing out

  • DNS resolver misconfiguration

  • Overly strict alignment checks

Given that abbott.com and northeastern.edu fail, DNS/authentication issues are less likely.

Reproduction Steps (For QA)

  1. Navigate to DMV login page.

  2. Select “Create Account” or “Forgot Password.”

  3. Enter an email address from any of the following domains:

    • abbott.com

    • adobe.com

    • northeastern.edu

    • any personal domain

  4. Observe:

    • “Domain not recognized” error OR

    • Silent confirmation with no email delivered

  5. Repeat with a fake Outlook address.

  6. Observe:

    • System accepts the address

    • No validation of mailbox existence

  7. Repeat with Gmail/Yahoo.

  8. Observe:

    • Instant delivery

    • Successful account creation/reset

Impact Assessment

  • Users cannot create or recover accounts unless they use a consumer email provider.

  • Affects small businesses, universities, corporations, and privacy‑conscious individuals.

  • Undermines adoption of the mobile driver’s license (myDL) program.

  • Increases support call volume.

  • Creates accessibility and equity concerns.

  • Damages trust in state digital services.

Recommended Next Steps

Immediate

  • Identify ownership of email validation and outbound email systems.

  • Review allowlist/denylist logic in application code.

  • Audit email security gateway rules.

  • Check routing logic for domain‑based paths.

Short‑Term

  • Decouple password reset links from browser session timeouts.

  • Implement 24‑hour token validity.

  • Add logging for domain‑based failures.

Long‑Term

  • Publish clear domain requirements (if intentional).

  • Ensure domain‑agnostic account creation (if unintentional).

  • Add alternative verification methods (SMS, authenticator app).

UX/CX Bug: A Detailed Look at the California DMV’s Email Verification Failure


Digital government services only work when they work for everyone. This week, I encountered a flaw in the California DMV’s online platform that affects anyone using a personal, business, or university domain for email. It also raises questions about the readiness of the state’s mobile driver’s license program, which depends on reliable account access.

What began as a simple password reset turned into a multi‑hour diagnostic session with DMV support, two very patient staff members, and a deeper look at how the system treats different types of email domains.

The Issue: Personal, Business, and University Domains Do Not Receive Verification Emails

I use my own personal domain (blackcats.org) because I value privacy and digital independence. In August 2025, I successfully reset my DMV password using that address. In December, the same process failed.

When I attempted a password reset:

  • No verification email arrived.

  • No error message appeared.

  • The system behaved as if everything was working, but nothing was delivered.

To rule out user error, I spent about an hour on the phone with a helpful DMV web support representative named James. Together, we tested the issue from multiple angles.

What We Tested

  • Password reset to my personal domain: no email.

  • Invitations to other personal domains I own: no email.

  • Registration attempts using Gmail and Yahoo: verification emails arrived instantly.

  • Testing business domains (boldium.com, adobe.com, abbott.com): the system displayed “domain not recognized.”

  • Testing a Northeastern University address (northeastern.edu): the system displayed “domain not recognized.”

  • Entering a completely fake Outlook address: the system confirmed it would send an email to that nonexistent address.

This pattern shows that the DMV system is treating personal, business, and university domains differently from large free email providers.

Something Changed Between August and December

Because I successfully reset my password in August, the sudden failure in December points to a platform change. My working theory is that the DMV implemented a new email validation or anti‑fraud system that is now incorrectly filtering or deprioritizing non‑mainstream domains.

This would explain:

  • The “domain not recognized” pop‑ups.

  • The silent failure to send emails.

  • The hours‑long delay before emails finally arrive.

  • The fact that Gmail and Yahoo work instantly.

If this is a security measure, it is over‑correcting. If it is a misconfiguration, it is a significant one.

Support Staff Confirmed They Do Not Know Who Owns This Issue

James escalated the issue internally, but the web support team did not know:

  • Who maintains the email validation system.

  • Who owns the domain‑filtering logic.

  • Who accepts bug reports for the platform.

He connected me with a manager named Robin, who listened carefully as I translated the technical details into plain language. I offered to speak with anyone on their engineering or security teams and promised to write up a summary they could share internally.

The Delayed Emails Eventually Arrived, But Were Useless

About two hours after ending my call with Robin, the verification emails finally appeared. When I clicked the links, I received the message:

"Your session has expired."

This confirms two things:

  1. The DMV is sending emails hours after the request.

  2. The reset links are tied to the original browser session, which expires long before the email arrives.

This design makes account recovery impossible for anyone affected.

Environment and Device Testing

To rule out client‑side issues, I tested the DMV website and the myDL app across multiple devices and operating systems. All systems were fully updated at the time of testing.

Desktop and Laptop Testing

  • Latest version of Google Chrome

  • macOS fully up to date

  • Tested on three separate machines:

    • One Mac mini

    • Two different MacBook models

  • Same behavior across all devices

Mobile Testing

  • iPhone with the latest iOS version installed

  • Latest version of the myDL app

  • The myDL app directs users to the DMV website for login and verification

  • Same failure pattern on mobile as on desktop

Conclusion This confirms the issue is not caused by:

  • Browser caching

  • Cookies

  • Outdated software

  • Device‑specific behavior

  • Network inconsistencies

The failure is consistent across multiple devices, operating systems, and access paths, which strongly indicates that the root cause is on the DMV’s backend systems, not on the user’s hardware or software.

This Affects More Than Privacy‑Conscious Users

This issue impacts:

  • People who run personal domains.

  • Small businesses.

  • Corporate employees.

  • University students, faculty, and staff.

  • Anyone using a domain that is not Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail, or Outlook.

If the DMV is intentionally limiting accounts to specific free email providers, they should disclose that clearly. If not, the system is silently failing in ways that lock out legitimate users.

Likely Causes: What Types of Systems Could Be Blocking or Delaying These Emails?

Because Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail, and Outlook receive messages instantly, we can rule out overloaded servers, global outages, or general queue delays. The DMV’s system is clearly capable of sending email immediately.

The root cause is almost certainly domain‑specific filtering or validation. These are the categories of backend systems that could cause exactly this behavior:

1. Email Security Gateways (Most Likely)

These systems sit between the DMV’s application and the outside world. They can:

  • Allow Gmail and Yahoo instantly.

  • Delay or block personal domains.

  • Reject corporate and university domains.

  • Apply domain reputation scoring.

  • Enforce allowlists or blocklists.

If the DMV added or updated one of these systems between August and December, it could easily explain the sudden change.

2. Application‑Layer Domain Validation

This is logic inside the DMV’s own code. Examples include:

  • Hardcoded allowlists of acceptable domains.

  • Hardcoded blocklists of risky domains.

  • Validation rules that reject anything not in a known set.

  • A new fraud‑prevention module.

This would explain:

  • “Domain not recognized” for Adobe, Abbott, Boldium, and Northeastern.

  • Acceptance of fake Hotmail or Outlook addresses.

  • Silent failure for personal domains.

3. Reputation‑Based Anti‑Abuse Systems

These systems score domains based on:

  • Age.

  • DNS configuration.

  • Traffic volume.

  • Historical spam reports.

They often:

  • Delay messages to low‑reputation domains.

  • Allow Gmail and Yahoo instantly.

  • Block small domains entirely.

This matches the multi‑hour delays and eventual delivery.

4. Email Routing Logic

If the DMV added routing rules such as:

  • “Send mainstream domains via Route A (fast).”

  • “Send unknown domains via Route B (scanned).”

Then Route B could be slow or misconfigured.

5. DNS or Authentication Checks

If the DMV’s outbound system is performing:

  • SPF lookups.

  • DKIM verification.

  • DMARC alignment checks.

And those checks are failing or timing out for personal, business, or university domains, that could cause delays.

Use Case for DMV Engineering, Security, and Product Teams

This section is written specifically for internal DMV teams who may need a clear, structured description of the issue.

Use Case: Email Verification Failure for Non‑Consumer Domains

Primary Actor: California DMV customer attempting to register or recover an account.

Preconditions:

  • User has a valid email address at a personal, business, or university domain.

  • User is attempting to register or reset a password.

Trigger: User enters their email address and requests a verification or password reset email.

Main Flow:

  1. User enters a valid email address at a non‑consumer domain (e.g., blackcats.org, boldium.com, abbott.com, adobe.com, northeastern.edu).

  2. System confirms that a verification email will be sent.

  3. No email arrives, or it arrives hours later.

  4. If the email eventually arrives, the link fails with “session expired.”

Alternate Flow (Consumer Domains):

  1. User enters an email address at gmail.com, yahoo.com, hotmail.com, or outlook.com..

  2. System confirms that a verification email will be sent.

  3. Email arrives instantly.

  4. User successfully completes registration or password reset.

Failure Points Observed:

  • “Domain not recognized” error for legitimate business and university domains.

  • Silent failure for personal domains.

  • Acceptance of completely fake Outlook addresses.

  • Multi‑hour delays for non‑consumer domains.

  • Reset links tied to browser session timeouts.

Impact:

  • Users cannot create or recover accounts unless they use a consumer email provider.

  • Small businesses, universities, and privacy‑conscious individuals are disproportionately affected.

  • The mobile driver’s license program is undermined by unreliable account access.

  • Support teams cannot resolve the issue because ownership is unclear.

Why This Matters for the Mobile Driver’s License Program

I support the mobile driver’s license (myDL) initiative. I prefer having my ID on my phone instead of carrying a physical card. Before Thanksgiving, I received a fix‑it ticket because the myDL app could not display my license, and the Alameda County Sheriff who pulled me over handled it with humor and grace.

But the success of the myDL program depends on:

  • Reliable account access.

  • Clear communication.

  • Inclusive digital design.

If users cannot create or recover accounts unless they use Gmail or Yahoo, the program will struggle.

What the DMV Should Do Next

If this is intentional:

  • Publish a list of acceptable email domains.

  • Explain the security rationale.

  • Provide alternatives for users who do not want to use large email providers.

If this is unintentional:

  • Investigate changes made between August and December.

  • Review domain‑validation logic.

  • Audit email delivery logs for delays and failures.

  • Decouple password reset links from browser session timeouts.

  • Communicate transparently with affected users.

Closing Thoughts

California has made real progress in modernizing its digital services. But this issue, whether caused by a misconfiguration, a security update, or an overly strict domain filter, is locking out legitimate users and undermining trust in the system.

I am sharing this publicly to help the right people inside the DMV understand the scope and urgency of the problem. If I am experiencing this across multiple domains, others almost certainly are as well.

If the DMV wants the mobile driver’s license program to succeed, fixing this should be a priority.